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Abstract 
 
Policy makers try to take account of public preferences when making trade-offs between policy 
options. Yet most estimates of the value of health and safety reflect only individuals’ self-interested 
preferences, neglecting their preferences over the distribution of public resources. We conduct an 
experiment in which participants choose between policy options that differ in their efficiency 
(expected number of fatalities or cases of ill health they would prevent) and their equity (defined in 
terms of the balance of risk reductions for different sections of the population). The policy options 
were framed as interventions to improve a hypothetical city’s water supply that would reduce the risk 
of death or ill health for people in different areas of the city to varying degrees. In order to examine 
whether self-interest would affect the trade-offs, we asked half of the sample about scenarios where 
they would personally benefit from some options. Our results suggest that efficiency is the most 
important single factor determining preferences between policy options, but decisions were 
influenced almost as much by equity as by efficiency. The effect of self-interest was smaller than that 
of the general concern for efficiency. We also elicited participants’ stated moral principles regarding 
trade-offs between equity, efficiency and self-interest, and found that their expressed principles were 
well-aligned with their choices. Our findings contribute to the growing evidence that distributional 
concerns matter when evaluating health interventions.  [228] 
Keywords: efficiency, equity, self-interest, moral principles 
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1. Introduction 
When deciding how to allocate resources to maximise societal welfare, difficult trade-offs are 
inevitable. Should resources be spent on education or healthcare? Are some health improvements 
more valuable than others? Such trade-offs involve weighing benefits and costs of different 
magnitudes, at different times, and to different recipients. 
Policy makers try to take account of public preferences when making trade-offs between policy 
options. This often involves using estimates of the monetary value of policy outcomes (e.g., fatalities 
prevented, health improvements, or environmental damage prevented or rectified), obtained using 
methods including contingent valuation (e.g., Carthy et al., 1999). However, most of these estimates 
reflect only the preferences that individuals express for their personal benefits and costs, inferred 
from their stated willingness to pay for reductions in their own risks or improvements in their own 
health or benefits to their own enjoyment of environmental amenities. To some extent, this self-
interested approach is legitimate, since it avoids double counting of the benefits of policies (for a 
useful discussion in relation to the Value of Statistical Life, see Jones-Lee, 1991). However, there is 
good reason to suppose that people have preferences which extend beyond concern for themselves. 
These preferences include concern for efficiency (maximising the expected number of fatalities or 
cases of illness prevented) and equity (balancing risk reductions for different sections of the 
population). By ‘equity’ we mean ‘gains egalitarianism’ rather than ‘outcome egalitarianism’ (see 
Tsuchiya and Dolan (2009)). Focusing exclusively on individuals’ values for their own outcomes may 
neglect their preferences over efficiency and equity considerations and thereby fail to adequately 
represent important sources of societal welfare.   
To ensure that resource allocations maximise social welfare, policies should ideally reflect the trade-
offs that individuals would make between self-interest, efficiency and other distributional concerns. 
However, we do not yet have an adequate account of these trade-offs in applied contexts.  This paper 
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presents evidence that begins to address this issue: we elicit preferences in the context of health and 
safety policy choices using a structured experimental design that helps us to disentangle the various 
factors entering into preferences for different policy options.  
Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our experimental design. In section 4 
we outline our results, and in Section 5 we discuss their implications. 
2. Theoretical Background and Research Questions 
Much of standard economic theory supposes that people are self-interested, utility-
maximising agents. However, extensive evidence suggests that this assumption fails to describe 
behaviour adequately. This evidence includes experiments and surveys suggesting that individuals are 
also concerned about the equity and efficiency of different gains (e.g. Tsuchiya and Dolan, 2009). Yet 
rather little attention has been paid to ways in which self-interest interacts with the equity-efficiency 
trade-off.  
Experimental economists have provided evidence that people are sometimes willing to reduce their 
own payoffs in order to improve the payoffs of others, contrary to the assumption of perfectly self-
interested agents (see a 2011 meta-analysis by Engel and a 2014 review by Güth and Kocher). This 
laboratory evidence is accompanied by a wealth of theoretical models that account for preferences 
for others’ welfare (often modelled as interdependent preferences, such as in Bergstrom, 1999) and 
for distributional concerns (e.g., fairness models including Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; and 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
However, evidence is mixed regarding how closely behaviour in laboratory experiments corresponds 
to behaviour in the context of richer scenarios and in the field (Laury & Taylor, 2008; Voors et al., 2012; 
Galizzi & Navarro-Martínez, 2018). It is not clear that we can make confident inferences from the 
laboratory evidence when considering the equity-efficiency trade-off in policy relevant contexts. 
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There is a long and rich literature on the notion of fairness in public policymaking in the context of 
safety. Writing in Science, Arrow et al. (1996, p. 222) state: 
“Although benefit-cost analysis should focus primarily on the overall relation between benefits 
and costs, a good analysis will also identify important distributional consequences.” 
Despite the recognition that distributional consequences matter, it is not straightforward to define 
exactly what is involved. For example, when evaluating measures to reduce risks of premature death, 
should we value each prevented fatality equally irrespective of the ages of the potential beneficiaries 
or should we value each year of increased life expectancy equally even though this tends to favour 
younger people over the elderly? (For more on this issue, including a discussion of the ‘senior discount’ 
controversy, see Viscusi 2014; also Jones-Lee et al. 2015).  
More progress has been made in the health economics literature. Bobinac et al. (2012) provide a 
useful review of the literature about trade-offs between efficiency and equity when cost-effectiveness 
is measured in quality adjusted life years (QALYs). They advocate consideration of both efficiency and 
equity concerns, where equity can be determined by patient characteristics such as age. Light (1992) 
discusses the efficiency-equity trade-offs embedded in the healthcare system, beginning with the 
premise that equity and efficiency are both desirable. Wagstaff (1991) proposes a Social Welfare 
Function approach to incorporate these efficiency and equity concerns into health resource allocation 
decisions. However, neither Light nor Wagstaff provide empirical evidence about public preferences 
over the trade-off between efficiency and equity. Lindholm, Rosen and Emmelin (1996) examine the 
requirements for meaningful empirical estimates of the trade-off, and in a pilot study, over two thirds 
of the 68 Swedish politicians responsible for healthcare that took part in their study stated that they 
would be willing to give up efficiency to achieve more equity.   
Patrick et al., (1973) and Nord (1992) use a Person Trade-Off approach, a framework for eliciting trade-
offs. These trade-offs are embedded in choices between helping different people to achieve different 
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levels of health. Dolan (1998) extends this method and provides an experimental test demonstrating 
a general preference for fairness. More recently, Bleichrodt et al. (2005) find that people are averse 
to inequalities in the domain of health, and propose that policy values for health effects should be 
adjusted using equity weights.  
Ubel et al. (1996a) conducted a survey to elicit equity and efficiency trade-offs from a sample including 
the general public and specialists including medical ethicists. Between 41% and 56% of their 
participants recommended: 
“offering [a] less effective screening test to everyone, even though 100 more lives would have 
been saved by offering [a] more expensive test to only a portion of the population.” (p. 1174) 
In follow up studies, Ubel et al. (2000) provide evidence that the trade-off between efficiency and 
equity is not continuous, but rather the preference for equity is ‘all or none’. When offered a choice 
between a more efficient versus a more equitable policy, unless the equitable option helped 100% of 
the population, respondents tended to choose the efficient one. In constrast, Johannesson and 
Gerdtham (1996) found that respondents were “willing to give up 1 QALY in the group with more 
QALYs to gain 0.45 QALYs in the group with fewer QALYs” (pp. 365-366). They used a veil of ignorance 
approach, and a sample of 80 students.  
However, all of the health studies mentioned above elicit social preferences from impartial observers, 
setting aside self-interest. This is problematic, since this approach cannot account for individuals’ 
preferences for the equity and efficiency of the policies that affect them. Ubel et al. (1996b) present 
an experiment that directly compared self-interested utility scores with impartial person trade-off 
responses to ask whether “people place the same values on health care conditions when thinking of 
their own health as when thinking about health care policy” (p. 109). They find that social and self-
interested perspectives generate different implied distributions of health. The utilities of the worst 
conditions implied by impartial choices were much lower than those elicited when participants took a 
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self-interested perspective. Similarly, Nord et al. (1999) consider different distributional preferences 
including aversion to inequalities in health and discuss how these preferences can be combined with 
a self-interested measure of health state utilities. However, in both studies the social perspective and 
self-interested perspective are elicited, or proposed to be elicited, using completely different 
methods. Specifically, when engaged in the self-interested tasks, there was no scope to express 
preferences for equity.   
We present a study in which participants trade off different concerns within the same design. In some 
cases, participants were asked to consider their own self-interest alongside any efficiency and 
distributional concerns, while in other cases they were not themselves part of the population at risk 
and could express efficiency-equity trade-offs in the absence of self-interest.   
We also explore whether the ’magnitude’ of the outcome at stake can influence individuals’ 
willingness to trade efficiency for equity. We manipulate whether the policies would prevent illnesses 
(low stakes) or fatalities (high stakes). Camerer and Hogarth (1999) provide a useful review of studies 
presenting evidence that changing monetary stakes can influence social preferences. However, to our 
knowledge, no comparable research has been conducted in the context of health and physical risk.   
Self-interest, efficiency and equity trade-offs are liable to reflect a set of underlying moral principles. 
For example, an individual who chooses a policy that gives everyone in the population a risk reduction, 
despite offering a lower expected risk reduction overall, would appear to subscribe to some equity 
principle. An underexplored question is whether it is feasible to elicit individuals’ degrees of 
(dis)agreement with statements of principle; and whether there is a reliable relationship between 
people’s support for different moral principles and their expressed choices between policy outcomes. 
If so, knowledge about the nature, strength and distribution of people’s moral principles may be a 
useful additional input into policy making. 
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To summarise, this study aims to address three questions. First, how do people trade-off equity, 
efficiency and self-interest when choosing between different policies in the context of health and 
safety? Second, do these trade-offs differ when the stakes are changed? Third, are the preferences 
revealed through participants’ choices between policy options aligned with the principles which they 
endorse? 
3. Methods 
The methods were developed on the basis of the findings of a pilot study (n=107) conducted with 
student participants at the University of Durham. Results are available on request.  
3.1. Scenario 
Participants were asked to consider scenarios involving a city with an East and a West zone, each with 
100,000 inhabitants. These inhabitants were at risk of adverse health effects from different bacteria 
present in their water supply. Due to the different prevalence of bacteria across the zones, the 
baseline risk in the East zone is 18/100,000 whereas that in the West is 28/100,000. The full description 
is shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix.  
We manipulated self-interest between subjects by telling half of the participants that they lived in the 
East zone. The other half were not told they lived in the city and could therefore take an impartial 
view, analogous to that of a social planner. We use the choices of the impartial participants to 
investigate trade-offs between efficiency and equity, and compare these with the choices of those in 
the self-interest condition.  
Between subjects, we manipulated the harm caused by the bacteria. Half of the subjects saw a 
scenario in which the bacteria would cause fatality. For the other half, the bacteria would cause 
gastroenteritis (see Figure A2 in Appendix).  
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We defined four policy options, outlined in Table 1. The policies differed in terms of which bacteria 
they targeted (and hence which zone they helped), and in the magnitude of the risk reductions. We 
label each policy to reflect the nature of the risk reduction. Policy EO (‘East-only’) reduces risk in the 
East zone by 10 cases. Policy WO (‘West-only’) reduces risk in the West Zone by 20 cases. Policy 
BC (‘both constant’) gives both zones the same risk reduction: it reduces risk by 8 cases in each zone. 
Lastly, policy BR (‘both relative’) also offered a risk reduction in both areas: by 4 cases in the zone with 
the higher baseline (the West), and by 3 cases in the East.  
Participants saw shorter policy names (E instead of EO, W instead of WO, B instead of BC, and X instead 
of BR). Find the instructions and policy descriptions in the Appendix. 
Table 1. Policy Options 
Policy 
Option 
EAST ZONE 
(Baseline Risk = 18/100,000) 
WEST ZONE 
(Baseline Risk = 28/100,000) 
    
Risk Reduction Final Risk Risk Reduction Final Risk 
EO 10/100,000 8/100,000 0 28/100,000 
WO 0 18/100,000 20/100,000 8/100,000 
BC 8/100,000 10/100,000 8/100,000 20/100,000 
BR 3/100,000 15/100,000 4/100,000 24/100,000 
To summarise, we employed a 2x2x2 factorial between-subjects design, manipulating self-interest, 
stake size, and task order. Further details are provided below. 
3.2. Tasks 
Participants completed four tasks: a rating task and a comprehension task, where participants learned 
about the policies; a principles task, in which participants rated their agreement with various 
statements of moral principles; and a preference task, in which participants made choices between 
policy options. By randomising the order of the latter two tasks, we tested for the possibility that any 
alignment between principles and choices was simply a result of participants’ desire to appear 
consistent. Responses to the first task that respondents encountered cannot be influenced by this 
desire to appear consistent, so comparing responses to a task when it comes first with responses to 
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the same task when it comes second enables us to observe any such effects and, if necessary, make 
allowance for them. 
Rating and comprehension tasks 
These tasks were designed to familiarise participants with the policy options and to ensure that they 
had carefully considered the policy options before beginning the principles and preferences tasks. For 
the rating task, each policy option was presented on the screen in turn and participants were asked 
to rate them on a scale from very poor to very good (an example is shown in Figure A3 in the Appendix). 
Participants then answered either four or five comprehension questions (depending on the condition) 
about the important properties of the policies. In each comparison, the information about the policies 
was displayed on screen, and the respondent was asked to identify the correct answer. Participants 
immediately received the correct answer with an explanation. The questions were presented in 
random order, and the order of the options on the screen was also randomised. The comprehension 
questions and percentage of participants who provided correct answers are shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
Principles task 
In the principles task, participants saw six pairs of statements (see Table 2). Each statement embeds a 
trade-off between two relevant principles, representing opposite ways of thinking about how policies 
should be prioritised. Each statement favoured one principle over another, and participants were 
asked to explicitly express a relative preference between competing moral principles.  Participants 
indicated which statement in the pair best described their opinion on a 7-point scale (“strongly favour 
A over B”, “moderately favour A over B”, “slightly favour A over B”, “equally favour A and B”, “slightly 
favour B over A”, “moderately favour B over A”, “strongly favour B over A”). 
We asked participants to trade off the following principles: efficiency (to maximise the expected 
number of cases prevented); equity (to evenly spread the risk reduction across the city); self-interest 
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(to prioritise own risk reduction); helping those most at risk (to reduce the risk of those with the 
highest baseline); and inequity (offering a higher risk reduction to only a few citizens).  
From this task, we constructed an efficiency preference score that indicates the preference for 
efficiency against other concerns. The score is the number the times the participant favoured 
efficiency over the competing concern. The trade-offs that did not involve efficiency were included to 
induce participants to consider principles in the wider sense, and not only as a trade-off against 
efficiency.  
Table 2. Principles Task Questions 
Trade-Off 
Principle A 
The chosen option should… 
Principle B 
The chosen option should… 
1 Equity vs. 
Efficiency 
…make the water safer for everyone 
who lives in the city even if that 
means that fewer lives are saved. 
…save the most lives even if that 
means that the water is made safer 
for only some of the people who live 
in the city. 
2 Helping those 
most at risk vs. 
Efficiency 
…make the water safer for the people 
who are most at risk from the 
bacteria even if that means that 
fewer lives are saved. 
…save the most lives even if that 
means that the water is not made 
safer for the people who are most at 
risk from the bacteria. 
3 Equity vs. 
Inequity 
…make the water a little safer for 
everyone rather than a lot safer for 
only some of the people in the city. 
…make the water a lot safer for only 
some of the people in the city rather 
than a little safer for everyone. 
4 Equity vs. 
Helping those 
most at risk 
…make the water a little safer for 
everyone rather than a lot safer for 
the people who are most at risk from 
the bacteria. 
…make the water a lot safer for the 
people who are most at risk from the 
bacteria rather than a little safer for 
everyone. 
5 Self-interest vs.          
Helping those 
most at risk* 
…make the water safer for me even if 
that means that the water is not 
made safer for the people who are 
most at risk from the bacteria. 
…make the water safer for the people 
who are most at risk from the 
bacteria even if that means that the 
water is not made safer for me. 
6 Self-interest vs.    
Efficiency* 
…make the water safer for me even if 
that means fewer lives are saved. 
…save the most lives even if that 
means the water is not made safer for 
me. 
Note.  *self-interest condition only 
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Preference task 
In this task respondents made choices between policies (and indicated their strength of preference 
for the chosen one). We informed participants that due to the cost of treating the bacteria in the 
reservoirs, the government would not be able to implement all the policies and that “The following 
questions will ask you to tell us your opinion about which of the options you would prefer the 
government to choose. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your honest 
opinion.” With four policies, there are six pairwise comparisons (BC vs WO; EO vs WO; BR vs WO; EO 
vs BC; BR vs BC; BR vs EO). Every respondent saw every comparison, with the presentation order 
randomised between participants. We also randomised which options were presented on the left and 
right of the display. 
Figure 1. Preference Elicitation Task Example (self-interest condition) 
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Figure 1 shows a typical preference elicitation screen. Participants saw the longer summaries of the 
policies (as shown in Table A2 in the Appendix) if they selected “view full description below”. 
3.3. Estimation 
We assume a latent continuous variable P, capturing preference for the option that maximises 
efficiency at the expense of other considerations. Table 3 outlines the observable characteristics, both 
of the task and of the respondents, whose relationship with preference is explored.  
Table 3. Core Model and Statement of Principle Explanatory Variables (label, description) 
Main effects of treatment 
StatF Dummy for principle statements task completed before preference task 
Ftl Dummy for fatality scenario (otherwise gastroenteritis) 
Self Dummy for ‘living in the East zone’ treatment 
Main effects of choice scenario 
Eff Difference in total efficiency between Y and Z: number of cases prevented by 
Policy Y (the most efficient option in any given comparison) minus the number 
of cases prevented by Policy Z (the alternative to Y).  
Eq Difference in equity between Y and Z: difference between cases prevented in the 
West and in the East by policy Y, minus the difference between the cases 
prevented in the West and in the East by policy Z. Higher Eq indicates that the 
efficient option is also the most equitable.  
BenE Difference in benefit to the East zone between Y and Z: cases prevented in the 
East zone by policy Y, minus cases prevented in the East zone by policy Z. 
BenW Difference in benefit to the West zone between Y and Z: cases prevented in the 
West zone by policy Y, minus cases prevented in the West zone by policy Z. 
Interactions 
X Vector of the 9 pairwise interactions between the main effects of choice scenario 
and treatment, and the interaction between BenE, Self and Ftl. 
Demographics 
Vector of the demographic characteristics: 
Age Respondents’ age in years 
Fem Dummy for female respondent 
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HH Number of close relatives living in the household (e.g., children, partner, parents) 
Principles  
FavEff Efficiency preference score based on the principles task, capturing the extent to 
which participants favoured efficiency over the equity, self-interest and helping 
those most at risk. 
Eff x FavEff Interaction term  
Eq x FavEff Interaction term 
Notes. Variables capturing the effect of choice scenario characteristics are expressed in a common unit: cases 
prevented. BenW is highly collinear with BenE (𝜌 = -0.904, p-value = 0.0134) and hence will not be included in 
our models. 
We propose the following relationship between preference and our core explanatory variables: 
𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑡𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑞 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑒𝑛𝐸 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒈 𝜷  (1) 
To explore the relationship between preference and the endorsement of various moral principles, we 
add the efficiency preference score based on the principles task (FavEff) to our core model (which 
captures the preference for efficiency against other concerns such as equity, self-interest and helping 
those most at risk) along with its interactions with Eff and Eq. 
Preference is not directly observable, so we infer it from participants’ choices. In estimating the 
relationship proposed in (1), we use participants’ choices in the preference task as our dependent 
variable. Given the nature of this variable (7-point scale of strength of preference between policies), 
an ordered logistic model might appear to be suitable. However, meaningful interpretation of the 
coefficients in such a model requires that the proportional odds assumption holds. This assumption 
implies that the effect of the predictors should be the same for all levels of the dependent variable. A 
test using STATA command omodel revealed that this assumption fails to hold for our data (p < 0.001), 
making the ordered logistic model inappropriate. We therefore transformed our variable into a binary 
variable taking the value 1 if the more efficient policy in the pair was chosen, and 0 otherwise. 
Sacrificing granularity in the data allows us to perform logistic regression.  
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3.4. Participants 
The study was completed online by a non-student sample of UK residents between January and 
February 2017. We obtained 322 completed responses. Our sample is 48% female, ranging in age from 
20 to 71 (M=38.6, SD=10.83), with an average household size of 4 (M=3.9, SD=1.57). The 
randomisation to treatments was successful (with around 40 participants per cell), with no significant 
differences in observables, nor in the percentage of comprehension questions correctly answered 
(87% overall), between conditions. The study was implemented in Qualtrics and distributed through 
Prolific Academic, an online labour market. The median completion time was 13 minutes. Participants 
received a fixed payment of £2.50. 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive Results 
Stated Principles 
Participants stated their strength of preference (strong, moderate, or slight) in favour of one principle 
over another in each trade-off, or else they indicated that they equally favoured the two. The 
distributions of the responses are given in Figure 2. Each plot presents a trade-off between the two 
principles on the x-axis. For example, in Trade-off 1 the first bar represents the percentage of 
participants who strongly favoured equity over efficiency.  
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Figure 2. (Dis)agreement with Statements of Principle 
 
Trade-offs involving self-interest (trade-offs 5 and 6) gave rise to the greatest degree of skewness. 
When self-interest was traded off against “helping those most at risk”, 43.8% of respondents 
moderately or strongly favoured helping those most at risk over self-interest; and when self-interest 
was traded off against efficiency, this percentage increased to 45.6%. This pattern might reflect social 
norm adherence, by not prioritising oneself. It is less clear what the social norm would be when trading 
off the other principles, and this is reflected in more finely balanced response patterns: the most 
evenly balanced trade-off was between efficiency and helping those most at risk: respondents were 
almost equally distributed between equally favouring the statements, slightly favouring efficiency and 
slightly favouring helping those most at risk, with an overall slight preference for efficiency (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test p<0.05). 
We quantify how strongly participants favoured one principle over its comparator in each trade-off. 
Scores range from -3 for “strongly prefer Principle 1” to +3 for “strongly prefer Principle 2” where 
Principle 1 is the first one of the pair under consideration and Principle 2 is the second one of the pair. 
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For example, in the “Equity vs Efficiency” trade-off, a score of +3 indicates that the efficiency principle 
was strongly favoured over the equity principle.  
The data analysis is presented in Table 4. We found no significant difference between the self-interest 
and the impartial conditions, and no difference depending on the order in which participants 
completed the principle statements and the preference task. However, preferences for efficiency over 
equity, and for efficiency over helping those most at risk, were stronger in the fatality risk condition, 
compared to gastroenteritis. Preferences revealed over the principles are transitive for the sample as 
a whole, with the revealed preference ordering: efficiency ≻ helping those most at risk ≻ equity ≻ 
self-interest. These results also suggest that equity and efficiency are both important, and that self-
interest is not sufficient to override them.  
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Table 4. (Dis)agreement with Statements of Principle, by Condition 
Trade-off between 
Principle Statements 
Wilcoxon  
signed-rank 
test p-value 
Ha: Mean ≠ 0 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value 
Ha: Self-Interested ≠ Impartial Ha: Death ≠ Gastroenteritis Ha: Before ≠ After 
 
Principle 
1 
(-3) 
Principle 
2 
(+3) 
Mean† 
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Self-Int. 
(SE) 
Mean 
Impartial 
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Death  
(SE) 
Mean 
Gastro.  
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Before 
(SE) 
Mean 
After  
(SE) 
p-value 
1 Equity vs. Efficiency 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.0001 
0.36 
(0.14) 
0.43 
(0.14) 
0.6050 
0.64 
(0.13) 
0.15* 
(0.15) 
0.0257 
0.46 
(0.14) 
0.33 
(0.14) 
0.5013 
2 
Helping those most 
at risk vs. Efficiency 
0.20* 
(0.09) 
0.0176 
0.27 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
0.4755 
0.48 
(0.12) 
-0.09*** 
(0.13) 
0.0010 
0.23 
(0.13) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
0.6766 
3 Equity vs. Inequity 
-0.50*** 
(0.09) 
0.0000 
-0.53 
(0.14) 
-0.46 
(0.13) 
0.6101 
-0.41 
(0.13) 
-0.59 
(0.13) 
0.3165 
-0.44 
(0.13) 
-0.55 
(0.13) 
0.5739 
4 
Equity vs.                    
Helping those most 
at risk 
0.73*** 
(0.09) 
0.0000 
0.74 
(0.12) 
0.73 
(0.13) 
0.8834 
0.72 
(0.13) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
0.9659 
0.67 
(0.13) 
0.80 
(0.12) 
0.5499 
5 
Self-interest vs.          
Helping those most 
at risk 
0.90*** 
(0.13) 
0.0000 
0.90 
(0.13) 
n/a n/a 
0.79 
(0.19) 
1.01 
(0.18) 
0.3970 
0.72 
(0.19) 
1.09 
(0.18) 
0.2402 
6 
Self-interest vs. 
Efficiency 
0.86*** 
(0.14) 
0.0000 
0.86 
(0.14) 
n/a n/a 
0.69 
(0.21) 
1.04 
(0.19) 
0.2505 
0.94 
(0.21) 
0.78 
(0.20) 
0.4563 
Notes. † -3 = strongly favour the first concern over the second; 3 = strongly favour the second concern over the first. E.g., in trade-off 1, “-3” = strongly favouring equity 
over efficiency and “3” = strongly favouring efficiency over equity. *** p< .001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. 
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Preferences 
Having established that efficiency and equity both matter in principle, we next turn to preferences 
expressed through pairwise choices between policy options that embed these trade-offs implicitly. 
We define an option as ‘chosen’ if it was slightly, moderately, or strongly preferred over its 
comparator. Option BC was the most frequently preferred (chosen in 38% of the pairwise comparisons 
in which it appeared); followed by WO (chosen in 33% of the comparisons), with options EO and BR 
being chosen in a similar proportion of choices (12% and 10% respectively).   
For each comparison, we quantify participants’ choices according to the expressed strength of 
preference. Scores range from +3 for “strongly prefer Y” to -3 for “strongly prefer Z” where Y and Z 
are the policy options under consideration, and option Y is the more efficient option of the pair 
(offering a greater overall risk reduction). For example, in the WO vs. BC comparison, a score of +3 
indicates that the more efficient WO was strongly preferred to the less efficient BC.  
Table 5 presents the mean choices, alongside separate means for sub-groups by treatment. 
Differences by subgroup occurred between self-interested and impartial participants in four cases, in 
the anticipated direction. No significant differences were found between the gastroenteritis and 
fatality conditions, and only one significant difference was found in relation to task order: participants 
who completed the principles task before the preferences task made choices consistent with being 
more sensitive to baseline risks in the comparison between BR and BC.  
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Table 5. Policy Options Preferences, by Condition 
Policy Choice 
Wilcoxon  
signed-rank 
test p-value 
Ha: Mean ≠ 0 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value 
Ha: Self-Interested ≠ Impartial Ha: Death ≠ Gastroenteritis Ha: Before ≠ After 
 
Option Z  
(-3) 
Option Y  
(+3) 
Mean† 
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Self-Int. 
(SE) 
Mean 
Impartial 
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Death  
(SE) 
Mean 
Gastro.  
(SE) 
p-value 
Mean 
Before 
(SE) 
Mean 
After  
(SE) 
p-value 
1 BCE WO 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.4930 
-0.51 
(0.15) 
0.36*** 
(0.13) 
0.0000 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
0.7546 
0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.1843 
2 EOE WO 
1.40*** 
(0.09) 
0.0000 
0.94 
(0.13) 
1.85*** 
(0.09) 
0.0000 
1.41 
(0.12) 
1.39 
(0.12) 
0.7913 
1.36 
(0.11) 
1.45 
(0.13) 
0.2606 
3 BRE WO 
1.14*** 
(0.10) 
0.0000 
0.78 
(0.16) 
1.51*** 
(0.13) 
0.0011 
1.17 
(0.14) 
1.12 
(0.15) 
0.7895 
1.17 
(0.14) 
1.12 
(0.15) 
0.9976 
4 EOE BC 
1.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.0000 
1.76 
(0.12) 
2.17* 
(0.08) 
0.0494 
2.01 
(0.10) 
1.91 
(0.11) 
0.3403 
2.01 
(0.10) 
1.92 
(0.11) 
0.8177 
5 BR BCE 
2.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.0000 
2.24 
(0.09) 
2.19 
(0.09) 
0.4978 
2.25 
(0.08) 
2.18 
(0.10) 
0.7877 
2.10 
(0.10) 
2.34* 
(0.08) 
0.0341 
6 BR EOE 
0.44*** 
(0.10) 
0.0000 
0.48 
(0.14) 
0.40 
(0.13) 
0.5349 
0.46 
(0.13) 
0.41 
(0.14) 
0.9038 
0.35 
(0.14) 
0.53 
(0.14) 
0.3524 
Notes. † -3 = strongly prefer option Z over option Y; +3 = strongly prefer option Y over option Z. Superscript E denotes the option that was better for the East zone 
population, i.e., the self-interested participants. *** p< .001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. 
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3.2. Summary regressions 
So far, our analysis has suggested that efficiency, equity and self-interest all play a role in determining 
the preferences between different policy options. However, these analyses did not involve quantifying 
the relative importance of different motivations, stated principles, and experimental treatments. To 
address all of these issues, we next present a series of regression analyses.  
Table 6 presents five logistic regressions where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the most 
efficient option of the pair was ‘chosen’ (i.e., if it was slightly, moderately, or strongly preferred over 
its comparator). Because coefficients are not directly interpretable in logistic regressions, we report 
odds ratios instead. We consider the latter more appropriate than marginal effects. Marginal effects 
require evaluation at specific values of the covariates, typically the variable means. In our setup, the 
variables that capture differences in efficiency and equity across policy options (non-treatment main 
effects) take arbitrary values (-3 to +3). Hence, means (or any other point in their distribution) would 
not provide a meaningful benchmark to evaluate the effects. Odds ratios are interpretable as relative 
effects, making them more appropriate for establishing the relative importance of competing 
concerns.  
Odds ratios reveal the relative likelihood that the efficient option is chosen, given the level of the 
independent variable. The six choices per participant were pooled and standard errors were clustered 
at the participant level. Model (1) includes main effects only. Model (2) adds the demographics, which 
do not significantly modify the odds of choosing the most efficient policy option. Model (3) adds the 
interactions. Lastly, model (4) captures the relationship between preferences for efficiency versus the 
other concerns stated in the both the preference and the principles tasks. 
No significance was found for the main effects or interactions for the other treatment variables. That 
is, there were no differences between the fatality versus gastroenteritis treatments (Ftl), nor between 
the order treatments (StatF). This suggests that, within the domain of health and physical risk, 
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preferences may not be highly stake-sensitive, and are not influenced by prior deliberation about 
principles. 
In contrast, we found statistically significant differences relating to self-interest (Self). Specifically, 
‘self-interested’ participants were significantly less likely to choose the most efficient option than their 
impartial counterparts, indicated by the Self odds ratio being less than 1. This implies that self-
interested participants were more likely to sacrifice efficiency for other concerns compared to their 
impartial counterparts.  
This conclusion is supported by the effect of the variable which represented the benefit in the East 
zone (BenE). There is no significant main effect of this predictor at the 5% level, but as expected, the 
interaction between the Self and BenE is positive and significant: participants prefer policies that 
benefit the East zone, but only if they are in the self-interested condition. More precisely, whilst 
impartial participants are marginally less likely to select the efficient option if it benefits the East zone, 
self-interested participants were around 9% more likely to opt for it. However, a Wald test indicated 
that the effect of the Self x BenE interaction was significantly smaller than that of overall efficiency; 
this suggests that self-interest does not override affected participants’ concern for efficiency.  
While self-interest may draw people toward choosing the policy that helps those in the East zone the 
most, the concern for helping those most at risk would have the opposite effect. A variable measuring 
the difference in the benefit offered to the West zone (BenW) would capture this effect. However, this 
variable is almost perfectly correlated with BenE (𝜌=-0.904). Therefore, including BenE in our models 
allows us both to capture the effect of self-interest (through the interaction the Affected condition 
dummy variable) and to control for any preference for helping those most at risk thanks to the high 
correlation between them. In fact, at the 10% level, participants are around 4% less likely to choose 
the efficient option if it saves an additional life in the East zone. We attribute this to a concern for 
wanting to help those most at risk (i.e., those living in the West zone).  Altogether, this allows us to 
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interpret the other coefficients in the model as free from the effect of any concern for helping those 
most at risk. 
The two other main effects had a significant impact on choices. Eff is a positive and significant 
predictor, and this effect is robust across model specifications. For each additional incidence of harm 
prevented by Policy Y compared to Policy Z, respondents are between 11.5% and 18.5% more likely to 
choose the efficient option. Eq is another robust, positive indicator for choice: when the efficient 
policy is also more equitable than the other policy, it is statistically significantly more likely to be 
chosen. Specifically, for a one-person difference in Eq between the policies, the efficient option is 
between 8% and 11% more likely to be chosen. A Wald test indicated that the coefficients of the 
variables capturing efficiency and equity concerns were significantly different (p-value < 0.05), with 
Eff having a greater influence on choice than Eq. 
Finally, we turn to the relationship between choices and principles. Model (4) suggests that for every 
additional principle trade-off in which efficiency was favoured over the competing principle, the odds 
of choosing policy Y over Z increased by 58%. This indicates that endorsements of principles are 
strongly aligned with choices.  
The odds ratios of the interactions between the FavEff variable and the main effects Eff and Eq can be 
regarded as multiplier effects. The FavEff x Eff interaction is not significant (p>0.05) and the FavEff x 
Eq is in the anticipated direction, but its magnitude and significance are weak (0.01<p<0.05). 
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Table 6. Odds Ratios (robust standard errors, in 322 clusters at the participant level) 
Choice of the efficient option Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Main effects of treatment     
StatF 1.272 1.254 1.259  
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.297)  
Ftl 
 
1.085 
(0.180) 
1.113 
(0.186) 
1.076 
(0.252) 
 
Self 0.511*** 0.502*** 0.569*  
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.146)  
Main effects of choice scenario     
Eff 
 
1.151*** 1.151*** 1.185*** 1.115*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.030) 
Eq 
 
1.083*** 1.084*** 1.109*** 1.114*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014) 
BenE 1.004 1.004 0.961  
(0.010) (0.0102) (0.023)  
Interactions (X)     
Eff*Self   0.957  
   (0.023)  
Eff*Ftl   1.001  
   (0.024)  
Eff*StatF   0.990  
   (0.024)  
Eq*Self   0.969  
   (0.016)  
Eq*Ftl   0.996  
   (0.015)  
Eq*StatF   0.999  
   (0.015)  
BenE*Self    1.094**  
   (0.030)  
BenE*Ftl   1.009  
   (0.026)  
BenE*StatF   0.973  
   (0.019)  
BenE*Self *Ftl 0.998  
   (0.033)  
Principles     
FavEff    1.580*** 
    (0.192) 
Eff*FavEff    1.029 
    (0.016) 
Eq*FavEff    0.987* 
    (0.007) 
Demographics     
Age  1.014 1.014  
  (0.009) (0.009)  
Fem  0.859 0.857  
  (0.144) (0.146)  
HH  0.966 0.965  
  (0.054) (0.055)  
Constant 2.541*** 1.807 1.799  
 (0.461) (0.771) (0.856)  
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920  
Note. *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05. 
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4. Discussion 
In this paper, we have provided evidence that metrics which only capture private interest may not 
provide an adequate representation of people's preferences: considerations of efficiency and equity 
also matter. To explore the relative impacts of, and interactions between, these factors we developed 
an experimental design that provides an empirical framework for generating new and more 
appropriate metrics. 
Our results suggest that efficiency is the more important of those two factors. However, equity was 
also an important concern and participants in our sample were willing to make trade-offs between 
them and sacrifice some overall benefit if the policy benefited more people. 
Participants in the self-interest condition favoured policies that benefited them personally, and as a 
result their preference for the most efficient option was weaker than for the impartial respondents. 
Nonetheless, self-interest was not sufficient to nullify the influence of overall efficiency. Our results 
imply that neither taking a purely self-interested nor a purely impartial perspective will provide an 
accurate basis for policymaking. Álvarez and Rodríguez-Míguez (2001) identified self-interest as a 
driver of disparities between patients’ and general population preferences. By quantifying the 
difference between ‘self-interested’ and ‘impartial’ respondents’ preferences, we contribute to the 
debate on whose preferences should be taken into account to inform policy (see Dolan (1999)). 
We also explored the relationship between the endorsement of moral principles and respondents’ 
policy choices. Respondents revealed a transitive ordering of principles: efficiency ≻ equity ≻ self-
interest. The relationship between principles and choices was independent of the order in which the 
tasks were presented. Such transitivity and stability encourages further exploration of the possibility 
that data about popular endorsement of moral principles could be an important complement to stated 
preferences elicited through choice.  
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The policy decisions in our experiment were hypothetical, and so the responses may have embodied 
a socially desirability concern. However, if their stated preferences express how they believe societal 
resources ought to be distributed, these preferences may be as valid a basis for public policy as 
preferences elicited under incentive-compatibility. 
To conclude, in order for policy decision-making to respect the preferences of the affected population, 
it is important to take account of the extent to which individuals would be willing to trade efficiency 
for equity, and to understand how such considerations may be balanced against the self-interested 
preferences of different sections of the population. This paper offers an empirical framework that can 
be used to address these issues and reports some indicative results from a study implementing that 
framework. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Bacteria Introduction & Policy Options Rating (no self-interest, fatality condition) 
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Figure A2. Bacteria Introduction & Policy Options Rating (self-interest, gastroenteritis condition) 
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Figure A3. Example Rating Question 
 
 
Table A1. Comprehension Questions 
Policy Comparison Question 
Correct answer 
(%) 
1 EO vs. WO Which option would make the water safer for the 
people who are most at risk from the bacteria? 
WO 
(81%)  
2 WO vs. BR Which option would make the water a lot safer for 
some of the people who live in the city rather than a 
little safer for everyone who lives in the city? 
WO 
(84%) 
3 BC vs. EO Which option saves lives (avoids gastroenteritis 
cases) in both zones of the city rather than in just one 
zone of the city? 
BC 
(95%) 
4 WO vs. BC Which option would save the most lives (avoid the 
most gastroenteritis cases)? 
WO 
(86%) 
5 BC vs. BR* Which option would make the water safest for you 
and your household? 
BC 
(94%) 
Note. *self-interest condition only. 
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Table A2. Policy Options Descriptions for Participants 
Policy 
B 
(BC) 
 
Bacteria B can be eliminated from the water supply in the East Zone and the West Zone. 
16 people’s lives would therefore be saved / 16 fewer people will have gastroenteritis 
over the next 10 years – 8 lives / people from each zone. This means that those who 
live in the East Zone (like you do) would have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis 
from the bacteria in the water supply reduced from 18 in 100,000 to 10 in 100,000. 
Those who live in the West Zone would have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis 
from the bacteria in the water supply reduced from 28 in 100,000 to 20 in 100,000. 
Policy 
E 
(EO) 
Bacteria E can be eliminated from the water supply in the East Zone. 10 people’s lives 
would therefore be saved / 10 fewer people will have gastroenteritis over the next 10 
years – all from the East Zone. This means that those who live in the East Zone (like you 
do) would have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the 
water supply reduced from 18 in 100,000 to 8 in 100,000. No one who lives in the West 
Zone would benefit from this option – their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from 
the bacteria in the water supply would be unchanged at 28 in 100,000. 
Policy 
W 
(WO) 
Bacteria W can be eliminated from the water supply in the West Zone. 20 people’s lives 
would therefore be saved / 20 fewer people will have gastroenteritis over the next 10 
years – all from the West Zone. This means that those who live in the West Zone would 
have their risk of dying from the bacteria in the water supply reduced from 28 in 
100,000 to 8 in 100,000. No one who lives in the East Zone (like you do) would benefit 
from this option – your/ their risk of dying from the bacteria in the water supply would 
be unchanged at 18 in 100,000. 
Policy 
X 
(BR) 
All three bacteria which affect the water supplies in the East Zone and West Zone can 
be treated. Although the bacteria would not be completely eliminated by this 
treatment, 7 people’s lives will be saved / fewer people will have gastroenteritis over 
the next 10 years – 3 lives / people from the East Zone and 4 lives / people from the 
West Zone. This means that those who live in the East Zone (like you do) would have 
their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the water supply 
reduced from 18 in 100,000 to 15 in 100,000. Those who live in the West Zone would 
have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the water supply 
reduced from 28 in 100,000 to 24 in 100,000. 
Note. The text in blue was only shown to those participants in the self-interest condition. The text in red 
corresponds to the alternative versions for the death and the gastroenteritis conditions. 
 
 
